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R&D COOPERATION AND SPILLOVERS:
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Abstract
This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationship between R&D spillovers
and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows.
Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by
a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also
finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how,
indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus
suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming
spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against
outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing
free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while
managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners
than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in
understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.
JEL: D21, L13, O31, O32.
Keywords: Research and Development; Cooperation; Spillovers3
1. Introduction
When devising their innovation strategies, even large and self-contained organizations rely
increasingly on  cooperative R&D agreements.  The advantages of R&D cooperation are
compelling, as stressed by the technology management literature (Porter & Fuller (1986),
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad (1991), Tyler & Steensma (1995)): it allows to gain access to
skills and technologies, realize economies through the exploitation of complementarities,
share costs and risks and control competitive forces. Despite these apparent benefits,
empirical evidence on the one hand suggests that cooperation carries a disturbingly high
risk of failure (Kogut (1988), Harrigan (1988)), while on the other hand many seemingly
profitable cooperative partnerships are not consummated.  Firms expose, transfer and
develop valuable know-how within these cooperative R&D ventures.  Such information
flows, when uncontrolled, can undermine the long-run technological advantage of firms.
When uncontrollable but anticipated, these information flows lead firms to refrain from
engaging in seemingly profitable cooperative agreements, while if controllable and
managed appropriately, these information flows can result in more profitable and stable
cooperative agreements.
The relationship between different know-how flows—spillovers—and cooperation
is complex.  In a world of imperfect appropriability of know-how, cooperation can be a
vehicle to internalize the effect of involuntary transfers—the outgoing spillovers—that
occur. At the same time cooperating firms will invest more effort in protecting their
knowledge, i.e. in managing the outgoing spillovers. This increases the stability of R&D
cooperation by reducing the incentives for free riding by partners and by firms outside the
cooperative agreement. In addition, cooperation can be seen as an instrument to more
efficiently manage transfers of know-how among partners and even from outside the
cooperation—the incoming spillovers.  Von Hippel (1988) already stressed the existence
of, often very informal, technology trading networks in which partners manage substantial
inter-firm flows of information, see also Baumol (1992)). Such information sharing
improves the profitability of R&D cooperation.
The relationship between R&D cooperation and R&D spillovers, while relatively
well developed in theoretical models, remains largely unexplored in empirical work. The4
main contribution of this paper is in providing evidence on this relationship, stressing the
firm-specificity and endogeneity of spillovers. Our empirical results confirm the recent
trends in the literature which emphasize that spillovers are to a large extent firm-specific,
with firms actively developing their innovation strategies to maximally benefit from
information flows (Katsoulacos & Ulph (1998), Kamien & Zang (1998) as well as Doz &
Hamel (1997) for case study evidence).  The results further suggest that  it is important to
distinguish between incoming and outgoing spillovers. Higher levels of incoming spillovers
and lower levels of outgoing spillovers induce a higher probability of cooperation.  While
the level of spillovers influences the decision of a firm to cooperate in R&D, the decision to
cooperate also affects the level of incoming and outgoing spillovers in an important way. A
cooperative agreement increases the incoming spillovers. This might be the result of
information sharing between partners. In addition, we find evidence that the absorptive
capacity of an individual firm increases the importance of these incoming spillovers.
Partners in a cooperative agreement also have more effective protection against outgoing
spillovers. This suggests that firms that engage in a cooperative agreement invest in
protecting the information transferred and created in the cooperative agreement. We thus
find evidence that firms actively manage information flows.   Furthermore, the effects of
incoming and outgoing spillovers depend on the type of research partner. In cooperative
agreements with research organizations or universities the level of incoming spillovers is
an important factor. This is related to the more generic nature of these information flows.
When cooperating with suppliers or customers, partners worry more about the outgoing
spillovers. Information developed and transferred in this type of cooperative agreement is
typically more commercially sensitive.
With most of the existing theoretical and empirical research treating spillovers as a
technology-driven  phenomenon, these results strongly suggest opening new avenues for
further research. The next section summarizes some robust findings from a wide range of
theoretical models from the industrial organization literature. Section 3 reviews some
related empirical literature on the conditions facilitating R&D cooperation and on the
measurement of R&D spillovers.  The link between R&D cooperation and spillovers is5
then explored empirically in section 4, using EUROSTAT/CIS survey data from Belgian
manufacturing firms. Section 5 concludes.
2. Industrial Organization results on R&D cooperation and spillovers
While the management literature typically analyzes cooperation from a transaction costs’
framework (Pisano (1990), Robertson & Gatignon (1998), Oxley (1997))
1 or uses
resource-based theories (Tyler & Steensma (1995), Doz & Hamel (1997),
2 the Industrial
Organization (I.O.) literature emphasizes competitive motives for engaging in R&D
cooperation and concentrates on the knowledge flows and appropriability issue among
market participants. When anticipated, voluntary or involuntary transfers of know-how
complicate R&D strategies in a non-trivial way.  De Bondt (1996)  provides an overview
of the impact of spillovers on non-cooperative R&D investment levels.  A similar focus on
the effects of spillovers is omni-present in reviewing the IO literature on R&D cooperation
(e.g. Katz (1986), Spence (1984), d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988), Beath et al (1988),
Kamien et al (1992), Suzumura (1992), and Leahy & Neary (1997)).  From this literature,
three important issues conditioning the interrelation between the profitability of R&D
cooperation and spillovers: coordination, free-riding and information sharing, can be
distinguished, although they are very often heavily entwined.
Coordination. A multi-stage, non-tournament, model is typically used where R&D
investments have an impact on the output market either through a cost-reducing or
demand-enhancing effect.
3  Firms cooperate in the R&D stage, but may continue to
compete in the product market.  This cooperation is typically industry-wide and takes the
                                                       
1 While arms length technology transactions invoke transaction costs, own development limits
these transaction costs, but prevents quick access to external know-how. Collaboration is a hybrid
organizational form that allows external access, organizing transfers of technology at lower
transaction costs as in an arm’s length setting.
2 Resource based theories suggest that R&D cooperation allows to build new competences more
effectively by joining complementary know-how, at least if firms have the capacity for learning
from partners.
3 Henderson & Cockburn (1994) provide evidence that R&D competition is less of a racing type,
but more of a spilling type. However there also exists a series of tournament models of R&D
cooperation (see Beath et al (1995)).  In such a tournament model cooperating firms increase
their probability of success due to the sharing of complementary know-how (Sinha & Cusumanu
(1991)).6
form of firms coordinating R&D choices in order to maximize joint profits.  Other than a
recognition of mutual interests in such R&D cartels and possibly including some sharing of
results in research joint ventures (see the Kamien et al (1992) typology), no joint R&D
projects are undertaken.
4   Focusing on a world where R&D is imperfectly appropriable
and R&D results would leak out involuntarily to rival firms, these models concentrate on
horizontal R&D cooperation among rival companies as a mechanism allowing to
internalize these spillovers.
5 The presence of spillovers thus conditions the R&D
investment of the firms. Spillovers are non-firm specific and symmetric: one firm’s
outgoing spillover is the other firm’s incoming spillover.
A first finding in these models is that investment in R&D when firms cooperate is
increasing in the level of the spillover. A second finding across the various models is that
when spillovers are high enough, i.e. above a critical level, cooperation in R&D will result
in higher R&D investment compared to non-cooperating firms.  Cooperation allows to
overcome the disincentive effect from the positive externality, which the outgoing spillovers
create on rival firms.  The nature of product market competition critically shapes this
disincentive effect, with the critical spillover level depending on whether firms are
marketing substitutes or complements.
6 When goods are substitutes the level of product
differentiation and the number of rivals are important parameters that determine the critical
spillover level. (see De Bondt et al (1992), Röller et al (1997)).
Given the assumption of coordination through joint profit maximization,  while
ignoring any explicit costs to R&D cooperation, these models find that cooperation always
increases the firms’ profitability.  But more importantly, spillovers seem to increase the
profitability of cooperation in R&D.  Furthermore, once spillovers are sufficiently high, i.e.
                                                       
4 These theoretical models thus largely ignore one of the most important motives for R&D
cooperation, identified in empirical studies such as Mariti & Smiley (1983), Hagedoorn &
Schakenraad (1991) and Sakakibara (1997a,b), namely synergies from exploiting asset
complementarity.  Only part of these synergies can be generated through coordination, allowing
firms to better access the existing pool of spillovers. Also explicit sharing of costs and risks is
ignored, although costs of R&D will be lowered through avoidance of wasteful duplication.   For
a model on joint R&D projects, see Veugelers & Kesteloot (1994).
5 An important implicit assumption of all these models is that R&D investment or effort is
contractible or enforceable in some way.
6  When firms are marketing complementary goods, cooperation always results in higher R&D
investment levels than non-cooperation, independent of the level of spillovers.7
above the critical spillover level,  higher spillovers make R&D cooperation increasingly
more attractive as compared to independent R&D (De Bondt & Veugelers (1991)).
7   This
means that when spillovers are high enough, firms have an increasing incentive to engage
in R&D cooperation.  Such cooperation would furthermore enhance welfare.
8
Free-riding. Most I.O. models focus on the welfare and profitability of R&D cooperation,
ignoring the stability of such cooperation. Next to cooperative stability threatened by non-
participating companies, the venture has to worry about  free-riding by partners who may
conceal their technological expertise while trying to absorb as much as possible of the
partner’s knowledge (e.g. Shapiro & Willig (1990), Baumol (1993)). Kesteloot &
Veugelers (1994) find that cooperative agreements that are profitable, and at the same time
also stable, require involuntary—outgoing—spillover levels that are not too high.
9  This
result can be confronted with the supra reported result that the profits from cooperation are
higher, the larger are the outgoing spillovers. Higher spillover levels, although they
increase the profits from cooperation through coordination, also and more importantly,
increase the profits from cheating by a partner and from free-riding by an outsider to the
cooperative agreement.
10 Hence cooperative ventures become more profitable the more able
firms are in managing the outgoing spillovers: restricting outgoing spillovers and thus free
riding by protecting its information while selectively sharing information with partners.
This result emphasizes a potential dual role of spillovers: outgoing spillovers which might
jeopardize the cooperative agreement and incoming spillovers which increase the
attractiveness of the cooperative agreement. This brings us to this last role of spillovers.
                                                       
7 At the critical spillover level, profitability of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies
would coincide.
8 This result is important for the antitrust treatment of R&D cooperation (Ordover & Willig
(1985), Jacquemin (1988), Shapiro & Willig (1990)), Cassiman (1998)).
9 Using repeated game theory methodology, cheating can be prevented by the use of grim-trigger
strategies specifying an eternal dissolution of an industry-wide venture. An alternative approach
to solve the internal stability problem is through the organizational design of the venture.  Perez-
Castrillo & Sandonis (1996) for instance characterize incentive compatible and individually
rational contracts that lead to disclosure and hence formation of profitable research joint ventures.
10 Veugelers & Kesteloot (1994) show that when an R&D agreement allows for joint R&D,
synergies from complementarities between partners will improve the profitability and stability of
R&D cooperation, stifling the incentives to cheat with higher spillovers.8
Information Sharing. Some I.O. models take into account that firms can indeed manage
spillovers, for instance by voluntarily increasing the spillovers among cooperating partners,
as in the research joint venture scenario of Kamien et al (1992). Such information sharing,
which increases the incoming spillover for partners,
11 is found to further increase the
profitability of cooperation in R&D. Furthermore, information sharing not only increases
the profitability of R&D cooperation, it also makes such agreements more stable, since it
allows to make the punishment of non-sharing harsher (Kesteloot & Veugelers (1994)).
Eaton & Eswaran (1997) show that when technology trading cartels are not necessarily
industry wide,  information sharing is an even stronger stabilizing force.  In this case, a
much stronger punishment can be specified, namely the ejection of the cheating firm from a
technology trading coalition, followed by the continuation of information sharing by the
non-cheating members. Similarly, De Bondt & Wu (1997) find that information sharing
produces larger coalition sizes that are both internally and externally stable.  In a recent
paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) explicitly model the choice of spillovers by
cooperating and non-cooperating firms and find that research joint ventures will always
share at least as much information as non-cooperating firms because research joint
ventures maximize joint profits.
Entwined with the issue on whether spillovers are exogenous or endogenous, is the
issue on whether spillovers are symmetric or not.  In most I.O. models, firms generate and
receive spillovers to the same extent.  Assuming symmetrical in- en outgoing spillovers
fails to capture the idea that when allowing firms to manage these technology flows, the
aim is to minimize the creation of spillovers—the outgoing spillovers— while at the same
time maximize the incoming spillovers.  Minimizing outgoing spillovers implies excluding
others from sharing through the use of effective legal and strategic protection measures.
As already indicated, firms can maximize incoming spillovers by cooperating with other
firms in information sharing cartels. Alternatively or at the same time, they can try to
increase incoming spillovers by investing in “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levintahl
(1989)): spillovers are more efficient in reducing own costs when the firm is engaged in
                                                       
11 The increased incoming spillover of one partner is the outgoing spillover of the other. This
matters directly if your partner is a potential competitor or indirectly if spillovers can move from9
own R&D.  This model implies that own R&D might directly influence the level of
spillovers, particularly the incoming spillovers, while also indirectly affecting the
profitability of R&D cooperation through coordination. In cases where coordination
increases the R&D expenditures of partners, these higher R&D investments, in turn,
improve the partners’ absorptive capacity. The direct effect of higher absorptive capacity
is to increase the incoming spillovers, but indirectly the higher absorptive capacity
increases the efficiency of the given level of incoming spillovers, and as a result increases
the profitability of R&D cooperation. This notion of absorptive capacity has been recently
integrated into the I.O. models on R&D cooperation by Kamien & Zang (1998). They
show that firms that cooperatively choose their R&D expenditures, maximize information
flows—their incoming spillovers—through the choice of very broad research directions for
the research joint venture. If the firms cannot coordinate their R&D expenditures, they are
more concerned about managing their outgoing spillovers by choosing a more narrow
research approach. However, given that cooperation implies joint profit maximization,
cooperation remains the more profitable option.
To conclude, the I.O. models on R&D cooperation show that imperfect
appropriation and hence involuntary outgoing spillovers of know-how make R&D
cooperation more attractive because of coordination but increase the instability of
cooperative agreements through free-riding.  Information sharing, which increases the
incoming spillovers, improves the profitability of R&D cooperation, while at the same time
increasing internal stability.  Recent extensions of these models, taking into account that
firms may manage these spillover levels actively,  clarify that firms will choose spillover
levels carefully to maximally capitalize on the benefits from R&D cooperation, increasing
incoming spillovers, not only through information sharing, but also by investing in
absorptive capacity while limiting the outgoing spillovers to non-partners.
3. Empirical research on R&D cooperation and spillovers
In contrast to the large number of theoretical I.O. papers on the relation between spillovers
and R&D cooperation, the topic has not yet been subjected to thorough empirical analysis.
                                                                                                                                                       
your partner to your competitors through your suppliers, customers or research partners and10
Brandstetter and Sakakibara (1998) find some indirect evidence of R&D cooperation on
research productivity and attribute this to the increased incoming spillovers between
partners. Related, Henderson & Cockburn (1996) find that incoming spillovers between
research groups in related therapeutical classes within and across pharmaceutical
companies, are an important determinant of research productivity. Incoming spillovers thus
impact the pharmaceutical’s innovation strategy and the boundaries of its organization.
There is however a growing empirical literature on the determinants of R&D cooperation
and investment, as well as an equally growing empirical literature on assessing the
importance of spillovers.  This section will review both these strands of the literature as a
pre-cursor to our attempt to study the  relationship between spillovers and R&D
cooperation, reported  in section 4.
3.1. R&D cooperation
With methodological problems assessing the profitability of R&D cooperation, most
studies indirectly use the frequency of occurrence of R&D cooperation to assess which
characteristics are more beneficial to R&D cooperation (Röller et al (1997), Kleinknecht &
van Reijnen (1992), Colombo & Gerrone (1996)).
12  These studies provide strong evidence
for the size and R&D orientation of firms to be beneficial to R&D cooperation.
13 This is
reminiscent of the absorptive capacity idea which stresses the need to have in-house
(technological) power to optimally benefit from R&D cooperation.  Size symmetry and
product complementarity among partners are also found to positively affect the likelihood
of R&D cooperation (Röller et al (1997)). Sakakibara (1997a,b) finds that access to
complementary knowledge is one of the most important objectives of establishing
government sponsored research corporations in Japan   Next to compatibility between
partners, Tyler & Steensma (1995) provide evidence for the importance of cost and risk
sharing for the success of R&D cooperation.
                                                                                                                                                       
brings us back to the free-riding issues.
12  The discussion focuses around the use of subjective (e.g. through questionnaires) versus
objective measures (such as financial measures or stock market responses).  Traditional financial
measures may be difficult to find separately for R&D cooperation.
13  The relationship between R&D intensity and R&D cooperation should be treated as a two-way
relationship : firms with own R&D are more cooperation prone, while cooperation may also
stimulate own in-house R&D.11
3.2. Spillovers
While public policy makers have recognized the public good character of (technological)
know how and shifted attention to strengthening the distributive power of innovative
systems, empirical studies on trying to assess a latent variable such as spillovers have
grown accordingly.  For a review, see Geroski (1996) or Griliches (1992).  This literature
can be classified into those studies trying to measure spillovers and those assessing the
impact of spillovers.  The approach used to measure spillovers are based on surveys  (e.g.
Levin et al ((1987), Levin (1988)).  These try to identify which information transmission
mechanisms are used and assess from that the existence of spillovers.   Typical spillover
channels identified are movement of personnel, informal communication networks,
meetings, input suppliers and customers, patent applications and reverse engineering
(Mansfield (1985)). The results from these studies indicate that independent R&D is one of
the most efficient channels to absorb external know-how. This confirms that the
management of these knowledge flows through investing in absorptive capacity is
important to capitalize on external learning (Levin & Reiss (1988), Cohen & Levinthal
(1989)).
A second approach is to infer the existence of spillovers from looking at how
know-how stocks of one agent (typically an industry) affect productivity growth in others
(Bernstein & Nadiri (1988)).  In order to assess which agents benefit more, a measure of
“distance” between receiver and generator is included.  Several approaches are used here:
input-output flows (Terleckyj (1974)), technology flows obtained from patent
information,
14 import or FDI flows for international channels (Coe & Helpman (1988)).
This last approach mingles causes and effects, where an effect of foreign R&D is taken to
be evidence of spillovers.  In general it is difficult to disentangle spillovers from other
factors such as increasing returns or rent spillovers, due to measurement error, as Geroski
(1996) argues.
Most of the studies trying to measure spillovers seem to suggest that spillovers are
likely to be substantial.  But even if they are imperfectly measured to be large, do they12
affect the innovative performance of agents?  Do they stimulate or undermine the
incentives to innovate?  The empirical studies inferring the impact of spillovers are not
conclusive on the direction of their effect. Bernstein & Nadiri (1989) find evidence that
foreign R&D indeed seems to substitute for own R&D, but studies by Jaffe (1986), Cohen
& Levinthal (1989) and Geroski et al. (1993) seem to suggest the opposite, namely that
spillovers stimulate own R&D.  Only firms with a strong own innovative capacity
benefited from spillovers from rivals’ innovations. Overall, the existing empirical literature
finds evidence that spillovers impact the incentives to innovate in important ways
(Griliches (1992)).
Given the favorable evidence for spillovers, the decision to cooperate should thus
interact with the effect of spillovers on innovation incentives. Information
complementarities are an important driver of cooperative agreements resulting in increased
information flows—the incoming spillovers—between partners. Given this motivation for
engaging in cooperative agreements, firms will be more concerned about protecting their
knowledge and the knowledge produced within the partnership while extracting as much
information as possible. This increases the need for protection, i.e. the management of the
outgoing spillovers. The fact that firms might manage spillovers—incoming as well as
outgoing—within and through cooperative R&D agreements, has not yet been addressed
empirically.
4. R&D cooperation and spillovers
The relationship between spillovers and the innovative strategies of companies in terms of
whether or not to cooperate in R&D has not yet been explored in empirical work.  This
section provides some first empirical evidence on this relationship.  Building further on the
results from the theoretical and empirical literature as reviewed in the previous sections, it
is clear that in order to understand this relationship better, spillovers need to be
disentangled into incoming and outgoing spillovers. Also the distinction between
involuntary and voluntary spillovers through managing information flows is important.
                                                                                                                                                       
14  Various approaches are pursued here: patent information on principal users in the Yale
studies, supplementary technology codes in EPO (Verspagen (1995)), clustering techniques (Jaffe
(1986)), citations (Jaffe, Henderson & Trajtenberg (1993)).13
Cooperation is not only influenced by exogenous spillovers but at the same time may be
used as a vehicle to improve knowledge transfers, leading to a simultaneous relationship
between cooperation and spillovers.
4.1. The data and the spillover measures
The data used for this research are innovation data on the Belgian manufacturing industry
that were collected as part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) conducted by
Eurostat in the different member countries in 1993. The survey intended to develop insights
into the problems of technological innovation in the manufacturing industry and was the
first of its kind organized in many of the participating countries. It contained questions
characterizing the R&D strategies of firms : whether they innovate or not, how they
acquire knowledge and technology, as well as whether they cooperate or not.
15  In addition,
the data allow to identify motives of and obstacles to innovation, sources of technological
information, mechanisms used to absorb know-how, as well as mechanisms used to protect
the results of innovation. A representative sample of 1335 Belgian manufacturing firms
was selected and a 13-page questionnaire sent out to them. The response rate was higher
than 50% (748). The researchers in charge of collecting the data for the CIS also
performed a limited non-response analysis and concluded that no systematic bias could be
detected (Debackere & Fleurent, 1995).
The sample used in this study is restricted to the firms that innovate.
16 These firms
are distinguished from those who do not innovate based on their answer on the question
whether they innovated in the last two years, by introducing new or improved products or
processes, and specified a positive amount spent on innovation: 60% (439) of the firms in
the sample claim to innovate, while only 40% do not.  This number is in line with the
survey results from other EC countries (Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 1996-2).
                                                       
15 An analysis of the R&D strategies chosen by the sample firms, is reported in Veugelers &
Cassiman (1998).
16 Only the innovating firms needed to fill out all questions in the survey. This might lead to
sample selection if we believed that cooperation is an important way to innovate for firms that
would otherwise not be innovative active. In the data set all firms that cooperate do have some
other innovation strategies, such as own R&D or some form of knowledge acquisition (see
Veugelers and Cassiman (1998)).14
The cooperation variable: the dependent variable, whether firms cooperate or not, cp, is
constructed from the questionnaire where firms responded whether or not  they cooperate
with either competitors, suppliers, customers or research institutes.  Cooperation means an
active participation of the partners in a joint R&D project.
17 Due to missing values,  we are
left with 411 firms that innovate of which 185 have some type of cooperative agreement.
The data allow to disentangle different types of cooperative partners: competitors (33),
vertical partners (135) and  research institutes (135). It is already interesting to note that
most of the cooperative agreements are vertical or with research institutes. This contrasts
with the bulk of the theoretical literature, which analyzes cooperative agreements between
competitors.
In order to capture the many aspects of spillovers, several measures are
constructed.  First, in- and outgoing spillovers are disentangled at the firm level.  Second
we construct industry-level spillover variables for each type of firm-specific spillover
variable to capture the exogenous nature of spillovers, determined by technology or market
characteristics.
18
Incoming spillovers: in the questionnaire, firms rated the importance for their innovation
process of publicly available information such as patent information, specialist
conferences, journals and gatherings, and expositions or fairs on a 5-point Likert scale
(from unimportant (1) to crucial (5)).
19  In order to manage the answers to these questions,
we aggregated the answers by summing up the scores on these variables and re-scaled the
total score to a number between 0 and 1 to generate a measure of incoming spillovers:
INSPILL.
20  This measure is firm-specific.  The variable indINSPILL is the average
                                                       
17 The questionnaire only contains information on whether firms cooperate or not.  No
information on extent and nature of the cooperative agreement or on the number of cooperative
agreements within one category was available.
18 The data do not allow to identify spillover flows to and from partners versus non-partners in
cooperation.
19 Other information sources included suppliers and customers, research institutes and
competitors.  These were not included to avoid tautology with the cooperation variable, but
including these sources in the spillover variables did not alter the reported results.
20 The rescaling of a variable with a the Likert scores between 1 and 5 to a variable between 0 and
1 is done for each Likert score used in the analysis: rescaled score = (score - 1)/4. This makes15
industry score for the firms responding in the sample.
21 The questionnaire thus provides a
direct measure of the importance of incoming spillovers for the innovation process. Indirect
measures typically assume that a given proxy for spillovers, such as R&D performed by a
related industry, works uniformly across industries and firms.
Outgoing spillovers: the questionnaire allows to construct proxies on the effectiveness of
protection measures for the innovation process, which can be used as a reciprocal for
outgoing spillovers. We distinguish two types of protection: legal protection through
patents, brand names, copy right, and strategic protection through secrecy, complexity or
lead time of the product. Again we aggregated answers by summing up the scores of the
answers to these questions and generate a measure of legal and strategic protection against
outgoing spillovers: PROTleg and PROTstrat respectively.  Next to these firm-specific
variables, industry averages are constructed: indPROTleg and indPROTstrat.
In Figures 1 to 3 we plot the cumulative distribution of the importance of incoming
spillovers (INSPILL) and the effectiveness of protection against outgoing spillovers
(PROTleg and PROTstrat) for cooperating and non-cooperating firms. These figures
provide some first indication of the correlation between higher incoming spillovers and
lower outgoing spillovers and the propensity of firms to cooperate.  The cumulative
distribution of cooperating firms always lies below the cumulative distribution of the non-
cooperating firms, indicating a higher rating of cooperating firms of the importance of
incoming spillovers as well as a higher rating on the effectiveness of protection of know-
how, with legal as well as strategic means.
4.2 The empirical model
The decision of the firm on whether to cooperate or not is based on comparing the
profitability of both options. We estimate a Probit model of this decision. The latent
variable in our model is the difference in the profitability of the cooperation option with the
profitability of not cooperating, cp*:
                                                                                                                                                       
comparisons of coefficients feasible. The questionnaire did not provide a weight of the relative
importance for each of the questions.
21 The industry is defined at the nace 2 digit sector level.16
cp* = P
c(X) - P
nc(X) = b’X + e,
where P
c are profits when cooperating, P
nc are profits of non-cooperation and X is a
vector of firm and industry characteristics. We assume that e has a normal distribution
with zero mean and variance one.
22 We are interested in estimating b and more specifically
the effect of a change in the independent variables on the marginal probability of
cooperation. Our observation, the decision to cooperate or not, cp, depends on the value of
this latent variable:
cp = 1 if cp* > 0,
cp = 0 if cp* £ 0.
As pointed out before there seems to be a strong correlation between the decision
to cooperate and our spillover measures, with a possible endogeneity problem. The level of
spillovers might affect the profitability and hence the decision to cooperate, but the
decision to cooperate could also influence the actual level of spillovers, when firms use
cooperative agreements as a vehicle to manage information flows. Cooperating firms may
try to maximize incoming spillovers through information sharing, which will enhance the
profitability as well as stability of cooperation.  In response to free-riding, firms will want
to limit outgoing spillovers to non-partners.  Although outgoing technology flows to
partners are essential in information sharing agreements in search of synergies, carefully
managing this exposure of own know-how within the alliance is necessary in view of the
threat of opportunistic partners. We expect that firms that are better at restricting outgoing
spillovers in general, will be more successful at controlling information sharing with their
partners.
To address this possible endogeneity problem, we will model a system of
simultaneous equations of cp, INSPILL and PROTstrat and estimate it by using a two-
stage-least-squares estimation procedure. The variable PROTleg measuring the
effectiveness of patent protection, although firm-specific, is not assumed to depend on the
cooperation.
                                                       
22 The results for the Logit model are very similar.17
cp = f(INSPILL, PROTleg, PROTstrat, indINSPILL, indPROTleg, indPROTstrat, Xcp)
with Xcp=(SIZE, SIZEsq, COST, RISK, TECH)  (1.1)
INSPILL = g(cp, Xinspill)
with Xinspill=(indINSPILL, INFOint, BasicRD) (1.2)
PROTstrat = h(cp, Xprotstrat)
with Xprotstrat=(indPROTstrat, INFOint, EXPint, TIME) (1.3)
A sufficient number of other independent variables affecting cooperation, Xcp, but also
spillovers, Xinspill and Xprotstrat, need to be identified.  Xcp reflects the other
independent variables affecting cooperation, besides the endogenous and exogenous
spillover variables.  This includes SIZE, as measured by firm sales, a variable most often
found in other studies explaining cooperation (see supra).  To check for any non-linearity
in the size relationship, a quadratic size term is included as well, SIZEsq.  As work by
Mariti & Smiley (1983) a.o. has indicated, other motives such as cost and risk sharing as
well as getting access to new technologies are important drivers for cooperation.  The
survey information allows to proxy for these motives. The firms rated the importance of
different obstacles to innovation on a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial).  When costs
are an important obstacle to innovation, we expect to observe more cooperative agreements
with the purpose of cost sharing. We construct an aggregate measure of the responses to
questions as lack of suitable financing, high costs of innovation, long pay-back period or
difficult to control cost of innovation: COST.  Similarly RISK is the response to
importance of high risks as barrier to innovation.  TECH is the importance of lack of
technological information as barrier to innovation. Although a lack of internal technology
may drive firms to cooperate to access missing technologies externally, it simultaneously
reduces the scope for complementarities to exploit through cooperation.  A lack of
externally available technologies reduces the scope of relevant partners.
For incoming spillovers, INSPILL, the literature seems to suggest that especially
absorptive capacity through internal technological capabilities is important to optimally
benefit from external information.  The survey asked for the importance of internal sources18
of information to innovation on the Likert scale from 1 to 5, which we use to proxy for
absorptive capacity, INFOint. We should note the strong correlation between this variable
and whether or not the firm does internal R&D. Given that generic research is more
difficult to appropriate, firms that use more basicR&D, relative to applied R&D or
development are more likely to benefit from incoming spillovers and hence are expected to
have a higher score on INSPILL (see Vonortas (1994) for a model on different levels of
spillovers in the research versus development stage). The variable BasicRD measures the
importance for the innovation process of information from research institutes and
universities relative to the importance of suppliers and customers as an information source,
which we use to proxy for the basicness of R&D performed by the firm. The industry
variable indINSPILL is included as well to capture the technological conditions of the
industry influencing the ease of flows of know-how.
The strategic protection variable PROTstrat will be influenced specifically by
variables characterizing the competitive environment of the firm. The more competitive the
environment, the more a firm is expected to invest in protecting any technological
competence.  Included here are the variables EXPint, the share of exports in total firm
sales, as well as the pervasiveness of time-to-market based competition, TIME, measured
through the importance of uncertainty on the timing of market introduction of the new
innovation as barrier to innovation. More export intensive firms typically face a more
competitive environment, while strategic protection is more likely to be effective in
industries where there is more uncertainty regarding the timing of new market
introductions. Given that firms might invest in improving strategic protection, we include
INFOint as an explanatory variable. Firms with a higher internal technological capacity
might not only be better at absorbing incoming spillovers, but also be better at protecting
their knowledge through secrecy, complexity or lead time. The variable indPROTstrat is
included to capture technological conditions shaping strategic protection possibilities.
4.3  The results and discussion
We estimate a Probit model of whether the firms decide to cooperate or not. Section 4.3.1
reports the results both without and with taking the potential endogeneity problem into19
account with similar results (model (1) and model (2) respectively in Table 2). The two-
stage procedure allows to discuss what determines the level of in- and outgoing spillovers.
Table 3 shows the estimated INSPILL and PROTstrat variables from the second stage of
the 2SLS regression, whose results are discussed in section 4.3.2. We also jointly estimate
the models for vertical cooperation and cooperation with research institutes in a bivariate
Probit model.
23 These results are discussed in section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Results on cooperation
The coefficients in Table 2 present the marginal effect of the explanatory variables on the
probability of cooperating, while keeping everything else constant. We first discuss the
non-spillover determinants of cooperation. All the coefficients of these variables remain
fairly robust across the different regressions on the spillovers, correcting for the
endogeneity of spillovers or not. The effect of firm size is very significant.  Larger firms
are thus more likely to cooperate.  But size affects cooperation at a decreasing rate,
suggesting a significant non-linearity in the size relationship. This important size effect is
consistent with earlier work on the decision to cooperate (Colombo and Gerone (1996)).
When costs are an important obstacle to innovation, innovating firms are more likely to
engage in cooperative agreements (COST), confirming Tyler & Steensma (1995). While
cost-sharing seems to be an important driver for cooperation, risk-sharing is not.  Firms for
which risk is an important barrier to innovate are less likely to cooperate (RISK).  This is
not so surprising considering that it will be more difficult to manage cooperative contracts
minimizing opportunistic partner behavior when the technology is characterized by a large
amount of uncertainty.  Contrary to most of what the literature assumes, it seems
important to distinguish between costs and risks when analyzing the cooperation decision.
With an explanatory variable that combines cost and risk factors, insignificant results are
obtained. The more important the lack of technological know-how, the lower the
probability of cooperation (TECH). A lack of technology indeed reduces the scope for
complementarities to exploit through cooperation.  Sakakibara (1997a,b) also finds that
                                                       
23 46% of cooperating firms have cooperative agreements of both types. All the firms that
cooperate with competitors also have a cooperative agreement with suppliers/customers or
research institutes.20
expected complementaries are one of the most important motives for forming government
sponsored research consortia in Japan.
24
For the spillover variables, the correction for the endogeneity does not influence
the signs of the spillover effects, but significantly increases their coefficients, see Table 2.
Incoming spillovers have a positive and significant effect on the probability of firms
cooperating (INSPILL). When correcting for simultaneity, the coefficient on incoming
spillovers remains positive and very significant, but becomes much larger. This positive
coefficient is consistent with a coordination theory of cooperation, where the existing base
of know-how is better tapped by cooperating firms because of the improved technological
competence of the partners. This increases the expected profitability and hence probability
of cooperation.
Outgoing spillovers have a negative effect on the probability of firms cooperating.
The higher is the strategic protection, the lower the outflow of information, and the higher
the probability of cooperation (PROTstrat). Higher protection reduces the potential for
free riding within and beyond the cooperative agreement and improves the stability of these
agreements.  This coefficient remains significant but increases after correction for
endogeneity.  Also better legal protection improves the probability of observing
cooperation by the firm, but this coefficient looses significance after the correction for
endogeneity (PROTleg).
It is interesting to observe that once firm-level spillovers are included, the industry
level variables of the spillovers, indINSPILL and indPROTstrat, always fail to influence
significantly the decision to cooperate, whether correcting for endogeneity or not.  This
strongly suggests that in- en outgoing spillovers mainly matter at the firm level.  Only legal
protection seems to be industry specific. Firms operating in industries where legal
protection is important, have a higher probability of cooperation (indPROTleg).
25
                                                       
24 Where Sakakibara (1997a, b) explicitly analyzed the motives for cooperation in R&D, the CIS
questionnaire analyzed innovative behavior in general. The questions from which we derive our
explanatory variables were never directly related to the decision of the firm to cooperate or not.
As a result we expect our results to be less driven by what managers answering the questionnaire
thought was the “correct” answer with respect to the cooperation decision.
25 This is consistent with our assumption that PROTleg is not endogenously determined.21
The overall predictive power of the estimated cooperation model is good, with for
instance for the exogenous model, model (1), more than 70% of all cases predicted
correctly.
26  There is however a tendency to underpredict the number of cooperative cases:
only 62% of all cooperations were predicted correctly.
27
In conclusion, the results on the relationship between spillovers and cooperation
seem to suggest that indeed incoming and outgoing spillovers have an important and
separately identifiable effect: higher incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers or
stronger protection increase the probability of cooperation. The correction for the
endogeneity of spillovers is important for evaluating the effect of spillovers on the decision
to cooperate. The results also favor firm-specific rather than industry-specific spillover
variables, with the exception of legal protection mechanisms which, if they matter, seem to
matter more at the industry level.
4.3.2 Results on spillovers
In Table 3 we present the results of the second-stage regressions of INSPILL and
PROTstrat respectively. That there is evidence for simultaneity is suggested by the
significantly positive coefficient of the cp variable in the second stage estimations reported
in Table 3
28. Firms that are cooperating will have a higher rating of importance of
incoming spillovers.  This positive coefficient is consistent with an information sharing
explanation of cooperation where cooperating firms increase the incoming spillovers.
Likewise for outgoing spillovers, the second stage estimations suggest simultaneity.  Firms
that are cooperating rate the effectiveness of strategic protection higher. This might imply
that firms that engage in a cooperative agreement invest more in protection in order to limit
the outgoing spillovers and protect themselves from opportunistic partners and non-
partners.
For incoming spillovers, as expected, the importance of internal information for
the innovation process is significant in explaining the importance the firm attaches to
                                                       
26 The naïve model would classify 55% correctly.
27 The percentages for model (2) are comparable: 72% and 64% respectively.22
incoming spillovers (INFOint). We interpret this as evidence for the effect of absorptive
capacity of the firm. If firms generate a lot of information for innovation internally, it must
mean that they are better able at generating useful information for innovation from the
environment. Another determinant of the incoming spillovers is the relative importance for
the innovation process of information from research institutes and universities, which is
more generic, relative to the importance of suppliers and customers as  a source of
information, which relates more to specific developmental know-how (BasicRD). Firms
operating in industries characterized by easier external technology appropriation are more
likely to rate incoming spillovers as important (IndINSPILL).
Internal information sources for the innovation process are positive instruments for
protection of know-how, but their effect fails to show up significantly (INFOint).
However, firms facing tougher competitive environments, such as exporting firms
(EXPint) and firms for which lead times are important (TIME) will more effectively
protect their know-how strategically.  Again technology or market characteristics favoring
strategic protection will help firms to manage outgoing flows of information
(IndPROTstrat).
In summary, the correction for endogeneity of spillovers, although not affecting the
direction of the effects of incoming and outgoing spillovers on cooperation, suggests that
the average cooperating firm increases the importance of incoming spillovers, while also
the effectiveness rating of strategic protection increases.  Our results therefore provide
strong support for the information sharing aspects of incoming spillovers in understanding
cooperation, while at the same time, the management of protection against outgoing
spillovers is important for firms to engage in internally and externally stable cooperative
agreements.
4.3.3 Cooperation with different types of partners
Distinguishing between cooperation along the vertical chain, i.e. with suppliers or
customers, and cooperation with research institutes, allows to test the importance of the
                                                                                                                                                       
28 The Hausman test for endogeneity rejects the null hypothesis for no endogeneity of INSPILL
and PROTstrat at the 1% level of significance. The reduced form equations of the first stage
estimation of the two-stage least squares  procedure can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.23
type of partner on the relationship between spillovers and R&D cooperation. A third type,
cooperation with competitors, could not be included separately because of too little
observations. This fact is in itself interesting because it suggests spending more effort on
theoretical models specifying vertical rather than horizontal R&D alliances.
29 The results
of the bivariate probit model, corrected for endogeneity through a 2SLS estimation, are
presented in Table 2 in column (3) and (4) for vertical cooperation and cooperation with
research institutes respectively.
Starting with the non-spillover determinants of cooperation, it is interesting to
observe that high costs (COST) and high risks (RISK) are only relevant in affecting
cooperation with research institutes, while this is not important in explaining cooperation
within the vertical chain.  This result can be related to the more basic nature of joint R&D
with research institutes, entailing higher costs and thus scope for cost sharing and higher
risks with increased room for opportunism by partners. The search for external know-how
and complementarities, however, seems to be more important for vertical cooperations
(TECH). For both types of cooperative agreements, firm size is an important determinant,
with again evidence for a non-linear relation.
Regarding the effects of spillovers, some interesting differences emerge between
research and vertical cooperations. Incoming spillovers have a significantly positive effect
on cooperation with research institutes.
30 Firms cooperating with research institutes seem
to attach a higher importance to incoming spillovers, while incoming spillovers do not seem
to affect the likelihood of vertical cooperation. A different pattern emerges for outgoing
spillovers.  Outgoing spillovers are not important in deciding to cooperate with research
institutes.  For vertical cooperations however, limited outgoing spillovers are important to
induce cooperation, either firm-specific through strategic mechanisms or industry-specific
through patent-protection.  All this seems to suggest that outgoing spillovers to non-
industrial partners are less critical than spillovers between industrial partners. This is
                                                       
29 One of the few significant and distinguished effects that came out of the horizontal cooperation
regressions is that legal protection at the firm level is important (together with incoming
spillovers and size), while strategic protection failed to show up significantly.
30 The coefficient of INSPILL also increases significantly, but note that the coefficient of
indINSPILL increases as well and acts as a correction on the firm-specific incoming spillover
effect.24
reminiscent of the idea that competitors learn about their rivals through common suppliers
or customers. Similarly firms want to avoid backward integration by customers or forward
integration by suppliers because of what they learn through cooperative agreements. These
results also indicate that our measure of incoming spillovers proxies for more generic
information, which is generated and disseminated through R&D cooperation with research
organizations but which is not as commercially sensitive as the more practical information
that is generated and disseminated in cooperative agreements along the vertical chain. Our
results show that the explanatory variables for the pooled case nicely fall into two
categories: variables affecting cooperation along the vertical chain on the one hand and
variables affecting cooperation with research institutes on the other.
31
5. Conclusions
The empirical results presented on the relationship between R&D cooperation and
spillovers strongly suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which
rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more
effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. In addition, our
analysis finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher
effectiveness of protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle
to better manage information flows.  We thus find support for the theoretical models that
stress information sharing and coordination, related to incoming spillovers, and free
riding, related to outgoing spillovers as important elements for understanding R&D
cooperation. Given that most of the cooperative agreements are between partners along the
vertical chain, suppliers or customers, or, with research institutes or universities, it is not
surprising that we find little support for the theoretical models on coordination effects of
R&D cooperation related to the outgoing spillovers. Any effects of R&D cooperation in
these models results from the joint profit maximization by competing firms.
Two important conclusions that we can draw from our results are that spillovers
are firm-specific and that it is the firm-specific rather than industry-specific spillover
                                                       
31 A LR test for equality of coefficients for the full model as well as for the coefficients of
INSPILL and PROTstrat, is rejected at the 1% level of significance.25
variables that are important in explaining R&D cooperation. Firms actively manage
incoming and outgoing knowledge flows. Investing in absorptive capacity on the one hand,
and forming cooperative agreements on the other, seem to be important in the management
of these firm specific incoming spillovers. Furthermore, firms in more competitive
environments and firms that cooperate in R&D seem to invest more in strategic protection,
increasing its effectiveness and limiting outgoing spillovers. With the exception of legal
protection mechanisms, which seem to matter more at the industry level, these firm-specific
spillovers strongly impact the decision to cooperate in R&D. In recent years policy makers
have become convinced of the importance of spillovers in increasing the impact of
innovation through the diffusion of technology. Our results then suggest that policy makers
should concentrate their efforts less at the industry-level, targeting “strategic” sectors
rather at the firm-level by identifying and stimulating spillover generating firms, improving
the absorptive capacity of individual firms as well as encouraging spillover enhancing
cooperative agreements.
Besides spillovers, firm size and the traditional cost and risk motives as well as
search for complementary technological know-how are found to significantly drive R&D
cooperation.  While cost sharing is an important motivation favoring R&D cooperation,
riskiness of R&D projects, making it harder to devise stable R&D alliances, is associated
negatively with R&D cooperation. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners
revealed that outgoing spillovers to non-commercial research partners are less critical than
spillovers between vertically related partners. The level of incoming spillovers, however,  is
more important in understanding the former type of cooperation. Cooperation with research
institutes is induced by cost sharing, while avoiding risk.  Lack of technological
information is an important barrier to cooperative agreements with suppliers and/or
customers.
Given the lack of previous empirical work on this topic, the first results generated
by this paper provide some interesting suggestions for further theoretical work which
distinguishes between different information flows or different partners  and treats the level
of these information flows as strategic variables. At the same time, more empirical work
needs to be done to check robustness of the results.  The EUROSTAT/CIS data proves to26
be a rich set of information, allowing to replicate this exercise on other European countries.
However,  the qualitative nature of most of the information limits the analysis, in terms of
quantifying R&D cooperation, R&D spillovers and their relation.
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Table 1: Description of Variables
CP CP=1, if firms cooperate with suppliers,
customers, research institutes or competitors.
SIZE Firm Sales in 10
10 BEF.
SIZEsq Firm Sales in 10
10 BEF squared.
EXPint Export share in total Firm Sales
INSPILL Aggregate measure of importance of patent
information, specialized conferences,
meetings, publications, trade conferences,
seminars.
PROTleg Aggregate measure of importance of patents,
registration of brands, copyright as protection
measure of innovation.
PROTstrat Aggregate measure of importance of secrecy,
complexity of process design as a protection
measure of innovation.
IndINSPILL Inspill at industry level.
IndPROTleg Importance of legal protection at industry
level.
IndPROTstrat Importance of strategic protection at industry
level.
INFOint Importance of internal information sources for
the innovation process.
COST Aggregate measure of importance of no
suitable financing available, high costs of
innovation, pay-back period too long,
innovation cost hard to control as an obstacle
to innovation.
RISK Measure of importance of high risks as an
obstacle to innovation.
TECH Measure of importance of lack of
technological information as an obstacle to
innovation.
BasicRD Ratio of measure of importance of
universities, public and technical research
institutes as source of information for the
innovation process and measure of importance
of suppliers and customers as information
source for innovation process.
TIME Measure of importance of uncertainty about
timing  of market introduction of new
innovation as an obstacle to innovation.31
Table 2: Results of Probit Regression for Cooperation
All types of Cooperation Bivariate Probit Model




















































































































*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
standard errors between brackets.32





























*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%, standard errors between brackets.33


































































































*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.34
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